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. Introduction
The constitutional avoidance doctrine is a canon of construction dictating
that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which
such questions are avoided, [a court's] duty is to adopt the latter."' Although
the avoidance doctrine is nearly a century old, the Supreme Court's recent
reliance on it to avoid making unnecessary constitutional rulings suggests its
revival in American courts.' In its recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis,' the
Supreme Court relied on the avoidance doctrine in interpreting an immigration
statute involving the Attorney General's power to detain immigrants that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had ordered deported.4 Accord-
1. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Att'y
(en. v. Del. Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
2. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Raising Constitutional Doubts, TRIAL, Jan. 2002, at 68, 70
(concluding that Supreme Court's continued use of avoidance doctrine will likely result in lower
courts attributing it great weight).
3. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
4. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001) (construing immigration statute to
contain "reasonable time" limitation in order to avoid constitutional questions). Zadvydas
involved a resident alien, Kestutis Zadvydas, who was born of Lithuanian parents in a displaced
persons camp in Germany in 1948. Id. at 684. After a court convicted him of a felony and he
served his sentence, the Attorney General ordered Zadvydas deported. Id. When no country
would accept Zadvydas, the Attorney General relied on an immigration statute that involved the
post-removal period for deportees that she claimed allowed INS to hold Zadvydas in custody
until his deportation. Id. at 682-84. The issue the Court faced was whether the post-removal
statute authorized the Attorney General to detain a removable alien indefinitely beyond the
removable period or only for a period reasonably necessary to effect the alien's removal. Id.
at 682. The Court read a reasonable time limitation of six months into the statute and held that
at the expiration of six months, the immigrant is allowed to show that there is no significant
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ing to the Government's reading of the statute, the statute allowed for indefi-
nite detention - an interpretation that set off constitutional alarm bells for the
Court's majority, for they believed that indefinite detention of aliens might
violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.5 But rather than address
that concern directly, the Court interpreted the statute to contain a reasonable
time limitation, which permitted the Court to avoid deciding the constitution-
ality of detaining undeportable aliens indefinitely.6 Justice Anthony Kennedy
responded to the majority's reliance on the doctrine by saying that the Court
"commit[ted] its own grave constitutional error" and had written "a statutory
amendment of its own" that was in "obvious disregard of congressional
intent."7 Justice Kennedy's dissent also suggested that the Court's interpreta-
tion was particularly noxious in a case involving immigration matters because
Congress enjoys "considerable authority over immigration matters."' Accord-
ing to Justice Kennedy, the Court's ruling amounted to a "systematic disloca-
tion of the balance of powers."9
The Court's interpretation of the immigration statute at issue in
Zadvydas0 is now especially timely, given the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on American soil and the congressional response to those attacks."
Many groups, especially the media and various civil rights organizations, have
criticized the laws passed by Congress that give the government broad power
to pursue terrorists through surveillance, search warrants, and detention. 2
likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 701. The government then
must rebut the immigrant's showing. Id. The Court noted that this presumption does not mean
that the government must release every alien not removed after six months; rather, an alien can
be held in confinement until the government determines that there is no significant likelihood
of the alien's removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id.
5. See id. at 690 (noting that statute permitting indefinite detention of aliens would raise
"a serious constitutional problem").
6. Id. at 692.
7. Id. at 705 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 711 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 705 (Kennedy J., dissenting).
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(aX6) (2000) ("An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible ...
[or] removable or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the commu-
nity or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal
period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain] terms of supervision .... "); see also
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (citing immigration statute).
11. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Interept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (authorizing new law enforcement measures to combat terrorism).
12. See J. M. Lawrence, War on Terrorism: Anti-Terror Laws in Place: Feds Urgently
Implement Crackdown, BOSTON HERALD, Oct. 27, 2001, at 5 (stating that ACLU chapters plan
to monitor implementation of new antiterrorism laws to ensure govermient's respect for civil
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Furthermore, Attorney General John Ashcroft's approval of an emergency rule
that allows the government to monitor conversations between suspected
terrorists and their attorneys13 has incensed the same groups, which will likely
challenge the rule as a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance
of counsel. 4
These measures raise important questions about how much deference
courts should give Congress and the executive as they examine these and other
post-September 11 legislative and regulatory provisions. In particular, what
role will the constitutional avoidance doctrine play as courts confront the
difficult task of interpreting new immigration statutes? Will courts heed
Justice Kennedy's insistence that the political branches enjoy "primacy in
foreign affairs" s and interpret the statutes in such a way as to respect the
wishes of a government that is struggling to respond to a new threat? Or will
the courts follow the direction of Justice Breyer's majority opinion in
Zadvydas by "read[ing] significant limitations into other immigration statutes
in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation"? 6
This Note explores the judiciary's interpretation of immigration law
statutes, focusing on judges' reliance on the constitutional avoidance doctrine
as a means of construing statutes in this area of law. The Note argues that the
avoidance doctrine continues to be an indispensable tool of statutory construc-
tion for judges, within the context of both mainstream public law and immi-
gration law. 7 Part II examines the use of the avoidance doctrine in the
Zadvydas case and recounts the history of the doctrine in American courts.1
Part III evaluates the critiques of the avoidance doctrine by leading scholars
and jurists, including a discussion of Playing It Safe, 9 a recent book by Dean
rights); Bruce Fein, Trust... But Verify, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 30, 2001, at A16 (suggesting that
new antiterrorism laws will lead to targeted scrutiny of unpopular minority groups).
13. See National Security, Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg.
55,062 (Oct. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 500 and pt. 501) (proposing interim rule
authorizing Bureau of Prisons to monitor communications between attorneys and inmates to
deter acts of terrorism).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense"); George Lardner,
Jr., U.S. Will Monitor Calls to Lawyers; Rule on Detainees Called 'Terfying,' WASH. POST,
Nov. 9, 2001, at Al (reporting criminal defense lawyer's promise that rule would be challenged
in court "at first opportunity").
15. See Zadiydas, 533 U.S. at 725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that political
branches have primary role in foreign affairs).
16. Id. at 689.
17. See infra Parts V and Part VI (discussing value of constitutional avoidance doctrine).
18. See infra Part H (discussing use of avoidance doctrine in Zadvydas and other cases).
19. See LISAA. KLOPPENBERe, PLAYINoIT SAFE; HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS
HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW 277 (2001) (suggesting that by
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Lisa A. Kloppenberg that argues that the Court should reduce its reliance on
the doctrine because the doctrine stifles the development of constitutional
law. 0 Part IV analyzes the "plenary power" doctrine by which Congress has
traditionally enjoyed broad deference in crafting immigration policy and
examines how courts have slowly chipped away at that doctrine.2" Part V
explores how the avoidance doctrine can promote dialogue within the
branches of government and how, in the Zadvydas decision, such communica-
tion enriched public debate, advanced the separation of powers principle, and
promoted democratic governance.12 This Note concludes that courts should
not abandon the avoidance doctrine, but should use it in circumstances where
it preserves Congress's legislative supremacy as the Constitution envisions.'5
II. The Avoidance Doctrine
A. Zadvydas v. Davis
In 1948, Kestutis Zadvydas was born in a displaced persons camp in
Germany.24 The son of Lithuanian parents, Zadvydas immigrated with his
family to the United States when he was eight.2 Zadvydas eventually fell into
a life of crime, and authorities convicted him of cocaine possession.26
Zadvydas served two years of his sentence before being paroled, whereupon
the INS took custody of Zadvydas and initiated deportation proceedings.27 In
1994, the INS ordered Zadvydas deported, but it could not find a country to
accept him." Attorney General Janet Reno ordered Zadvydas held in INS
custody beyond the normal removal period of ninety days, relying on a statute
that stated that aliens ordered deported "may be detained beyond the removal
period."29 Zadvydas then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challeng-
ing his continued detention.
30
reducing reliance on avoidance doctrine, Supreme Court could fulfill its constitutional duty to
offer guidance on meaning of Constitution).
20. See infra Part I (evaluating criticisms of avoidance doctrine).
21. See infra Part IV (juxtaposing plenary power and constitutional avoidance doctrines).
22. See infra Part V (discussing inherent democratic values of avoidance doctrine).
23. See infra Part VI (suggesting that avoidance doctrine preserves balance of power en-
visioned under Constitution).





29. Id. at 682; see supra note 10 (quoting statute upon which Attorney General relied to
detain Zadvydas).
30. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-85.
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When Zadvydas's habeas petition reached the Supreme Court, Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, stated that although the Court could read the
statute to imply that the INS had authority to detain deportable aliens indefi-
nitely, such a construction raised serious doubt as to the statute's constitution-
ality.31 The Court then chose to construe the statute in a manner that was
"fairly possible" and yet permitted the Court to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion.32 The Court read an "implicit limitation" into the statute, interpreting its
language to restrict post-detention custody to a "period reasonably necessary
to bring about that alien's removal from the United States.133 The Court hinted
that it might uphold permanent detention as constitutional if the detention
provision applied more narrowly to groups such as "suspected terrorists," but
noted that such was not the case in Zadvydas because the statute applied
"broadly to aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including
tourist visa violations." 4 Revisiting the same point later in the opinion, the
Court stated: 'Neither do we consider terrorism or other special circumstances
where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and
for heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with
respect to matters of national security.135  Similarly, the Court rejected the
Government's contention that because Congress had "plenary power" to create
immigration law, courts should defer to the discretion of the executive and
legislative branches in this area. 6
Justice Kennedy was clear to point out in his dissent that his quarrel was
not with the judicial doctrine of constitutional avoidance itself.37 Rather, he
believed that the majority used the constitutional doubt rule as a vehicle - a
"guise" in Justice Kennedy's words - to rewrite a statute in a way contrary to
31. See id. at 690 (noting that indefinite civil detention would violate Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, which forbids government to "depriv[e]" any "person... of... liberty...
without due process of Law" (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V)).
32. See id. at 689 (noting that "when an Act of Congress raises 'a serious doubt' as to its
constitutionality, 'this court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided'" (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 286 U.S. 22, 62
(1932))).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 691 (noting that statute did not apply to "small segment of particularly danger-
ous individuals," such as "suspected terrorists").
35. Id. at 696.
36. See id. at 695-96 (underscoring that Court's holding does not deny Congress's power
in admitting or removing aliens).
37. See id. at 705-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (conceding that "[t]he constitutional
question the statute presents, it must be acknowledged, may be a significant one in some later
case," but in this instance, "[t]he Court . . . misunderstands the principle of constitutional
avoidance which it seeks to invoke").
980
CONSTITUTIONAL A VOIDANCE N ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS 981
congressional intent.38 Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority's contention
that the statute had the potential to give the government powers that contravene
the Constitution, stating that "[o]ne can accept the premise that a constitutional
question is presented by the prospect of lengthy, even unending, detention in
some instances."39 However, Justice Kennedy contended that while that issue
might be a "significant one in some later case," Zadvydas's situation was not
such a case, and therefore the majority had mistakenly invoked the avoidance
doctrine.4" More troublesome for Justice Kennedy was the result of the Court's
application of the constitutional doubt rule: a statutory construction that
defeated the purpose of the immigration and Nationality Act as a whole.41
Justice Kennedy stated that the constitutional doubt rule "allows courts to
choose among constructions which are 'fairly possible,' 42 not to 'press statu-
tory construction to the point of disingenuous evasion even to avoid a constitu-
tional question. "'0 For Justice Kennedy, the Court's interpretation of the
statute was by no means a "fairly possible" interpretation, but rather a distor-
tion that was "plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
44
By insisting that the majority was in effect rewriting the statute, Justice
Kennedy suggested that the Court did not choose between two plausible
interpretations, one of which provoked constitutional doubt, but instead
created a "constitutional" interpretation that Congress never intended. And,
as the Court has said in the past, courts should not construe statutes to avoid
constitutional problems if the construction "is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.o45 Justice Kennedy's contention raises the question whether the
38. See id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In the guise of judicial restraint the Court
ought not to intrude upon the other branches.").
39. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
40. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that while another case might present
significant constitutional questions, that possibility should not force incorrect interpretation of
statute in this case).
41. See id. at 706-07 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that majority's interpretation of
statute to imply that detention could be no longer than reasonably necessary to effect alien's
removal had no basis in Immigration and Nationality Act).
42. Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
43. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60
(1997)).
44. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513
U.S. 64,78 (1994)).
45. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). In this case, the Court found that the National Labor Relations Board's
construction of a statute regulating unfair labor practices was not entitled to deference. Id. at
575-76.
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Court's use of the avoidance doctrine in this situation, with the doctrine's
attendant risks ofjudicial distortion of legislative measures, should be particu-
larly disfavored in immigration matters, given the discretion traditionally
enjoyed by the executive and legislative branches in this field.46
B. Avoidance as Canon of Interpretation
In the past, courts have used "canons" of interpretation to aid in elucidat-
ing the meaning of statutes. These canons are nothing more than loose back-
ground principles that guide courts when they confront Statutes.' 7 Forty years
ago, Professor Karl N. Llewellyn undermined the reliability of canons by
distilling over two dozen "canons of construction" from judicial opinions and
showing that for every canon there is an equally compelling canon containing
a contrary rule.4 Examples of"dueling canons" include the following: (1) one
court warns that a statute cannot go beyond its text, whereas another states that
the court must implement the statute beyond its text in order to fulfill its
purpose; and (2) one court cites the rule that expression of one thing in a statute
excludes another, but another court holds that statutory language can include
many different situations and does not limit construction to the examples that
appear in the statute.49 While formalistic "canons" no longer pervade judicial
opinions as they once did, courts still use "clear statement" principles and
background understandings as guides to interpreting statutes.
5°
1. Ashwander v. TVA. Justice Brandeis's Defense ofAvoidance
One of the surviving features of legal formalism is the continued reliance
on the avoidance canon.3' The avoidance canon has been the subject of sub-
46. See infra Part WVA (discussing Congress's traditional authority over immigration
issues).
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 405, 451 (1989) (stating that courts have always used "canons" or something similar to
canons as background principles for interpretation).
48. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950)
(concluding that attorneys must be familiar with opposing canons because, according to
Llewellyn, "[s]tatutory construction still speaks a diplomatic tongue").
49. See id. at 401,405 (discussing "thrust" and "parry" of competing canons).
50. See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 452-53 (noting that courts continue to use canons of
construction in form of "clear statement" principles and background understandings); see also
RICKARD A. POSNER, ThE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276 (1985) (stating that
federal and state judges frequently invoke canons, such as plain meaning rule, wherein if
language of statute is plain, it is unnecessary to construct statute).
51. See id. at 284-86 (explicating avoidance doctrine and then concluding that continued
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stantial interest by academicians and for good reason, given that the Supreme
Court has increasingly relied on it to help guide recent decisions.
52 The consti-
tutional avoidance doctrine became a staple of statutory construction after
Judge Brandeis defended it in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.53 In
Ashwander, the issue before the Court was the constitutionality of the govern-
ment's sale of its excess electricity to private customers.' Justice Brandeis's
concurring opinion outlined the importance of the Court's avoidance of consti-
tutional issues when at all possible in disposing of a case." Justice Brandeis
reiterated "a series of rules under which [the Court] has avoided passing upon
a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision."56
Once judges determine that constitutional issues might be at stake in their
rulings, Brandeis's framework provides them with helpful tools for construing
statutes without passing on constitutional questions. Specifically, courts
should not: (1) decide constitutional issues when the case does not require it,
popularity of canons demonstrates resilience of legal formalism).
52. See Chemerinksy, supra note 2, at 68 (noting increasing reliance by Supreme Court
on avoidance doctrine to decide cases in past two years); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitu-
tional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CoRNE L. REv. 831,833 (2001) (discover-
ing "significant kindling of academic interest in the avoidance canon").
53. 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (plurality opinion); see also Kelley, supra note 52, at 841
(noting that Justice Brandeis defended principle that Court's avoidance of constitutional
questions amounted to judicial deference to Congress and thus fostered separation of powers).
54. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 338-39 (1936) (plurality
opinion) (finding it not unconstitutional for government to sell excess electric power to private
power company). The plaintiff, Ashwander, sued the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
questioning the constitutionality of a contract that the federal government, through TVA,
entered into with the Alabama Power Company for use of the latter's power lines. Id. at 316-17.
Ashwander, a stockholder in the Alabama Power Company, challenged the government's foray
into the power business as both injurious to corporate interests and invalid, arguing that it was
beyond the constitutional power of the federal government to enter into the contract. Id. at 316.
Pursuant to the contract, TVA used the power lines in order to sell excess electricity that it
generated from a dam on the Tennessee River. Id. at 315-16. TVA sought to sell this excess
power to private individuals, thereby placing TVA in direct competition with private power
companies. Id. at 336-40. In a plurality opinion, the Court upheld the contract, stating that the
electric energy generated by the dams was the equivalent of government property and that the
government could dispose of its energy through sale rather than let it go to waste. Id. at 335-37.
55. See id at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing seven principles for avoidance
of constitutional questions); see also Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence:
How Judges Use theAvoidance Canon in Separation ofPowers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 85, 100-
101 (1995) (noting thatAshwander concurrence evinced Justice Brandeis's "conviction that the
Court must take the utmost pains to avoid precipitate decision of constitutional issues, and that
it must above all decide such issues only when it is absolutely unable otherwise to dispose of
a case properly before it" (quoting ALEXANDERM. BIcKE, TEM NMBiSHE OPINONS OF MR.
JUSTICE BRANDES: THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 2-3 (1957))).
56. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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(2) anticipate questions of law before it becomes necessary to decide them,
(3) formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is necessary, or
(4) decide a case on constitutional grounds when it can be decided on non-
constitutional grounds." Brandeis gleaned his fourth point from Crowell v.
Benson,"5 a case that, in addition to Brandeis's Ashwander concurrence, courts
often cite when seeking authority to justify invocation of the avoidance doc-
trine. 9 In Crowell, the Court stated that "[ilt is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction ofthe statute is fairly possible
by which the [constitutionall question may be avoided."'
2. The Origins and Development ofAvoidance Prior to Ashwander
Although legal scholars typically regard the Ashwander and Crowell
opinions as the foundational cases of the avoidance doctrine, the notion that
courts should sidestep constitutional questions when possible can be traced
back to Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Murray v. Schooner Charm-
ing Betsy.61 In Charming Betsy, Marshall warned that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains." '62 The message in Justice Marshall's admonition and
57. See id. at 346-47 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (outlining avoidance principles).
58. 285 U.S. 22(1932).
59. See Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (discussing Crowei v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), for proposition that courts should decide cases on
nonconstitutional grounds when possible).
60. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,62 (1932). Crowell involved an employer's attempt
to deny a worker's compensation award on the grounds that the employee was not an employee
at the time of his injury. Id. at 37. Under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (2000), the Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employ-
ees' Compensation Commission ordered the award, and the employer brought suit in district
court to enjoin its enforcement. Id. at 36-37. The employer-complainant argued that the Act
was unconstitutional in that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, and the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 37. The Court found that the challenged provisions
could be construed to avoid any constitutional doubts. Id. at 62.
61. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); see Kelley, supra note 52, at 836-37 (noting that many
believe Charming Betsy contained "germs" of avoidance doctrine); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Not Deciding, NEW REPUBUC, Oct. 29,2001, at 41,44 (stating that avoidance doctrine reaches
back to era of John Marshall).
62. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,118 (1804). Charming
Betsy involved a dispute over a pirated ship, its cargo, and whether the ship's owner violated
the law of the United States prohibiting commerce between the United States and France. Id.
at 115-17. A United States Commander seized the ship, sold her cargo, and sent her back to the
United States because he believed that the American-born owner of the ship, Jared Schattuck,
had violated American trade laws by using the ship to trade with the island of Guadalupe. Id.
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the avoidance principle that later followed was that courts should respect the
powers and discretion of the other branches.63 This principle of deference
rests in part on Congress's supremacy in legislative matters.64 With this
recognition, the judiciary assumes "its proper role in construing statutes,
which is to interpret them so as to give effect to congressional intention."'65
When the judiciary fulfills this role and sidesteps serious constitutional
questions, several advantages result. First, avoidance minimizes the friction
between Congress and the courts concerning the institution of judicial
review.s Second, avoidance prevents the nullification of a congressional
statute, thus saving Congress both the time necessary to amend the legislation
to render the legislation constitutional and the aggravation caused by the
Court's invalidation of one of its statutes.' Finally, judicial avoidance of
constitutional questions supports the separation of powers within the federal
The trade laws in question prohibited "the commercial intercourse between the United States
and France, and the dependencies thereof." Id. at 118. The Court stated that a court should
never construe an act of Congress to violate the law of nations or to violate neutral rights or
neutral commerce. Id. Further, the Court stated that the Act excluded individuals such as
Schattuck, who live outside the territory of United States and who have sworn allegiance to a
foreign nation. Id. at 120.
See Exparte Randolph, 20 F. Cas. 242,254 (C.C.D. Va. 1833) (No. 11,538) (Marshall,
J.) (stating that "if the case may be determined on other points, a just respect for the legislature
requires, that the obligation of its laws should not be unnecessarily and wantonly assailed").
But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist
Approach, 81 CORNEiL L. REV.'393, 448 (1996) (noting that in Marbury v. Madison, Chief
Justice Marshall "abandoned the Federalist postulate that a law could be declared unconstitu-
tional only when necessary to decide a case").
63. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitu-
tional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (underscoring that courts should not construe
statutes as unconstitutional unless legislature 'made very clear mistake); see also ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SriEmE COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrncs
35 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that Thayer believed courts should not tread upon powers that belong
to other branches of government).
64. See Kelley, supra note 52, at 843 ("The avoidance canon self-consciously recognizes
and seeks to respect Congress's primacy in the sphere of lawmaking.").
65. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,511 (1979) (Brennan, ., dissenting).
66. See POSNER, supra note 50, at 285 (arguing that construction of legislation to avoid
constitutional questions acts as buffering device that reduces friction between judicial and
legislative branches); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998)
("The doctrine seeks in part to minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving
congressional enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections.").
67. See PoSNER, supra note 50, at 285 (asserting that because of pressing work load,
Congress has little ability to amend statute found to be unconstitutional). Posner notes that if
Congress leaves the statute unamended, this avoids a collision with the courts. Id. at 284; see
also Sunstein, supra note 47, at 469 (noting that avoidance "responds to Congress's probable
preference for validation over invalidation").
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government because it preserves Congress's supremacy in the legislative
sphere.a
C. United States v. Witkovich
A case similar to Zadvydas, and one on which the Zadydas majority
relied, is United States v. Witkowch.69 Witkovich involved a statute that gave
the Attorney General the authority to monitor aliens who had been ordered
deported, but who remained in the country.70 In keeping with the anti-Com-
munist spirit of the post-World War II era, the Attorney General had inter-
preted his authority broadly to ensure the aliens' availability for deportation
by requiring that the aliens answer questions regarding their contacts with the
Communist Party.7" The district court found that the government's questions
were not relevant to the aliens' availability for deportation; furthermore, the
district court concluded that the Attorney General's interpretation was unac-
68. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 355 (1936) (Brandeis, J., con-
curring) ("One branch of the government cannot encroach on the domain of another without
danger." (quoting The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878))); see also Kelley, supra
note 52, at 841 (noting that in Ashwander, Justice Brandeis felt it essential to separation of
powers doctrine that judiciary exercise judicial review only as last resort); Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
AvoidingSerious ConstitutionalDoubts: The Supreme Court's Construction ofStatutesRaising
Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (arguing that when faced with
constitutional challenge to statute, Court will often rule on nonconstitutional grounds rather than
void statute because of separation of powers concerns); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003,1015-16 (1994) (noting Brandeis's belief that
separation of powers principle should make courts reluctant to exercise judicial review of
legislative act's constitutionality); Sunstein, supra note 47, at 469 (noting that avoidance
doctrine is "natural outgrowth" of separation of powers doctrine).
69. 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
70. See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 195, 202 (1957) (construing grant of
authority to Attorney General to ask aliens whatever questions he "deem[ed] fit and proper" as
limited to questions "reasonably calculated" to ensure alien's continued availability for deporta-
tion). In Witkovich, the Attorney General interpreted a statute giving him the authority to
prescribe regulations for aliens for whom a final order of deportation had been outstanding for
more than six months. Id. at 195-96. One provision in the statute allowed the Attorney General
to require aliens to provide information as the Attorney General might dem "fit and proper"
to ensure the alien's continued availability for deportation. Id. at 195. The Attorney General
interpreted the provision to give himself authority to ask probing questions regarding the alien's
contacts with members of the Communist Party. Id at 196-97. The Court found that the
Attorney General had exceeded his statutory authority because the purpose of the provision was
to assure the alien's availability for deportation and these questions did not serve that purpose.
Id. at 202.
71. See id. at 199 (describing Government's argument that national interest in avoiding
communist activities should require alien to answer questions regarding communist relation-
ships).
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ceptable because "[tlo hold that the statute intended to give an official the
unlimited right to subject a man to criminal penalties for failure to answer
absolutely any question the official may decide to ask would raise very serious
constitutional questions." 2 Accordingly, the district court, and ultimately the
Supreme Court, relied on the avoidance doctrine to imply a "reasonableness"
limitation in the Attorney General's authority to question aliens about their
activities and, in so doing, steered clear of the Attorney General's constitu-
tionally questionable interpretation of the statute.7
The majority decision in Witkovich drew noisy complaints from the
dissent, not unlike those of Justice Kennedy in Zadvydas.74 Justice Clark
pointed out that "the power of Congress with respect to aliens is exceedingly
broad"" and that "Congress beyond any question gave the Attorney General
the authority he exercised.0 6 An example of that authority, Justice Clark
noted, is Congress's power to expel any noncitizen whom it finds undesir-
able." Justice Clark considered the Attorney General's right to question
aliens a necessary supplement to that authority.7 Because the Attorney
General had a congressionally extended right to question aliens about past
activities, Justice Clark found no reason to invoke the avoidance doctrine. 9
I. Disputed Value ofAvoidance Doctrine
A. Undesirable Consequences and Practical Advantages
ofAvoidance Doctrine
The principle that directs courts to find constructions that are "fairly pos-
sible" can be problematic because, on its face, it appears to give little if any
regard to the legislature's purpose in passing a statute."s Professor Frederick
Schauer criticizes the "fairly possible" rule as equivalent to making a false
72. Id. at 197-98 (quoting United States v. Witkovich, 140 F. Supp. 815, 821 (N.D. Ill.
1956)).
73. See id. at 199-202 (construing statute to permit Attorney General to ask aliens
questions "reasonably calculated" to ensure alien's continued availability for deportation).
74. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (describing complaints of Justice Clark).
75. WVikovich, 353 U.S. at 208 (Clark, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 207 (Clark, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 208 (Clark, I., dissenting) (discussing power of Congress regarding aliens).
78. See id. (Clark, J., dissenting) ("The power given [to the Attorney General] is merely
supplemental to that of expulsion and is a necessary concomitant thereof .. ").
79. See id. at 207 (Clark, J. dissenting) (explaining that there are no constitutional
questions to avoid because Attorney General clearly has right to question past conduct).
80. See Frederick SchauerAshwanderRevisited, 1995 SUp. CT. REV. 71, 81. (discussing
how avoidance doctrine prevents courts from examining statute's legislative purpose),
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choice: "It is hard to imagine a case in which... there would be two identi-
cally plausible interpretations, such that... the rational judge would be re-
duced to something akin to tossing a coin."8' Schauer goes on to argue that a
decision by courts to choose a construction that Congress likely did not intend
comes at a significant cost, for the court is selecting a "suboptimal" alternative
over more plausible competing constructions. 2 In sum, critics of this rule
question the value of construing a statute in such a way that it is constitutional,
but might be significantly at odds with the legislature's intent."
At times, the type of statutory construction described by Professor
Schauer can lead to increased friction between the separate branches of
power - an ironic consequence, given that supporters of the avoidance doctrine
oftenjustify it on the grounds that it fosters separation of powers. 4 According
to Justice Kennedy, the Zadvydas majority's construction could trigger inter-
branch hostility because the Court "arrogat[ed] to the judicial branch the power
to summon high officers of the executive to assess their progress in conducting
some of the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers.
85
A survey of scholarly criticism of the constitutional avoidance doctrine
reveals that Justice Kennedy is not alone in his contention that the avoidance
canon is conducive to judicial usurpation of powers traditionally reserved for
other branches of government.86 Critics of the avoidance doctrine, including
Judge Henry J. Friendly, often point out that it allows courts to ascribe meaning
to a statute that might be contrary to the intent of the legislative body that
enacted the statute.' Judge Friendly wrote, "It does not seem in any way
obvious, as a matter of interpretation, that the legislature would prefer a narrow
construction which does not raise constitutional doubts to a broader one which
does raise them."' Similarly, Judge Richard A. Posner believes that "[t]he
practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions
is... to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition... and in
81. Id. at 83.
82. See id. (discussing cost of avoidance doctrine).
83. See Kelley, supra note 52, at 846 (underscoring critics' point that avoidance does not
necessarily respect legislative supremacy because "it is no service to Congress, no great act of
deference, to construe a statute in a manner contrary to its text and history in order to avoid even
confronting a constitutional doubt").
84. See supra note 68 (surveying various scholars who have noted connection between
avoidance doctrine and separation of powers).
85. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
86. See Harold J. KrentAvoidance and Its Costs: Application of the ClearStatementRule
to Supreme Court Review ofNLRB Cases, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 209, 245 (1983) (concluding that
construing statutes to avoid constitutional questions is likely to lead to "judicial policymaking").
87. See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211-12 (1967) (concluding that avoiding
constitutional doubts results in evisceration and equivocation of congressional statutes).
88. Id. at 210.
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so doing to sharpen the tensions between the legislative and judicial
branches. "89
Even as critics of the avoidance doctrine fault it for its conduciveness to
judicial policymaking, they acknowledge that it restricts meddling jurists who
might otherwise be tempted to rule on constitutional questions under a claim
of authority pursuant to the power of judicial review. Judge Posner under-
scores this paradoxical point by explaining that "[clonstruing legislation to
avoid constitutional questions... is ... one of those buffering devices by
which the frictions created by the institution of judicial review are mini-
mized.s'  Indeed, the Court sometimes predicates its use of the avoidance
doctrine on "the final and delicate nature of judicial review." 91
Professor Schauer believes that a court's interpretation of a statute to
avoid a constitutional question is as much of a judicial intrusion on the legisla-
ture as a court's invalidation ofthe same statute using a construction that does
not avoid the constitutional question. 92 Schauer does not accept theAshwander
principle that it is less troublesome for a court to give a statute an aggressive
construction that might be at odds with the legislature's intent than it is to show
aggression by meeting constitutional questions head on." The avoidance
doctrine's supposed benefits, Schauer believes, exact a high cost, for when the
Court fails to confront constitutional questions, it often does not give its
reasons and adopts suboptimal constructions, possibly sending the wrong
message to Congress about what might be unconstitutional.94
B. Shelter for Timid Courts or Guarantor of
Accountable Decisionmaking?
Perhaps the avoidance canon's staunchest critic is Dean Kloppenberg.
Her book, Playing It Safe, assails the Rehnquist Court's reliance on the avoid-
89. POSNER, supra note 50, at 285.
90. Id.
91. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 19, at 3 (stating that Court sometimes predicates use of
avoidance doctrine on judicial review, federalism, constitutional adjudication, and separation
of powers principles) (citing Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936)); see also
Kelley, supra note 52, at 845 (stating that avoidance canon discourages judges from engaging
in judicial review by requiring them to construct statute in constitutional fashion when possi-
ble).
92. See Schauer, supra note 80, at 74 (arguing that "it is by no means clear that a strained
interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial
intrusion than the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation
of the same statute").
93. See id. at 80-81 (questioning Ashwander view that judicial aggressiveness in statutory
interpretation is less troublesome than judicial aggressiveness in confronting constitutional
questions).
94. See id. at 81-90 (discussing repercussions ofAshwander interpretation).
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ance doctrine because, as she argues, the Court has used the doctrine to bar
lawsuits seeking redress for discrimination and, consequently, has evaded its
responsibility to offer guidance about the meaning of the Constitution.9"
Kloppenberg argues that the Court employs the avoidance doctrine to sidestep
contentious, socially sensitive issues in constitutional law, such as racial
discrimination, gender inequalities, abortion restrictions, and sexual orienta-
tion.' According to Kloppenberg, the Supreme Court should not shy away
from confronting constitutional questions because disagreement about the
meaning of the Constitution is "a healthy part of the adversarial system" and
the "Court is well situated to address some ofthose [controversial] issues when
politicians are reluctant to do so. '
On the other side of the equation, commentators who support the judi-
ciary's use of the avoidance canon argue that it helps guarantee judicial
minimalism rather than judicial activism. Professor Cass Sunstein, a defender
of judicial minimalism, argues that use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine
can reduce conflict between the different branches of government and lead to
validation, rather than invalidation, of congressional statutes." Additionally,
minimalism promotes democracy and "reason-giving" because it ensures that
important decisions are made by politicians, who are accountable to the elec-
torate.99 Professor William N. Eskridge, who has written extensively on the
values of statutory interpretation, concludes that the constitutional avoidance
canon allows the judiciary to "update" statutes by construing them to comport
with society's constitutional values."e°
95. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 19, at I (arguing that Court often uses avoidance to
protect against charge of judicial activism in "socially sensitive" cases dealing with racial and
ethnic discrimination, gender inequalities, abortion restrictions, sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, or environmental abuses). Kloppenberg criticized the Court's refusal in Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737 (1984), to hear a case brought by parents of black children who claimed that IRS
tax policies interfered with integrated education. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 19, at 75-78
(discussing Allen decision). The Court based its refusal to hear the case on the parents' lack of
standing. Id. at 78. Kloppenberg also faulted the Court's decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), to deny certiorari in a dispute
regarding the constitutional validity of an affirmative action program at the University of Texas
School of Law as a missed opportunity to fully guarantee equal protection. See KLOPPREERG,
supra note 19, at 122-31 (discussing repercussions of Court's denial of certiorari in Hopwood).
96. See id. at I (noting "socially sensitive" issues).
97. Id. at 3.
98. See Sunstein, supra note 47, at 468-69 (contending that avoidance complies with
Congress's likely preference for validation over invalidation of its statutes).
99. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME 5 (1999) (arguing that by leaving open
difficult constitutional questions, courts promote democratic accountability and deliberation).
100. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1007, 1021 (1989) (stating that Court can update statutes by construing them to reflect
society's "evolving values" in relation to Constitution).
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C. Message-Sending Power of the Avoidance Doctrine
The debate about the pros and cons of the constitutional avoidance doc-
trine tells us little about the message-sending effect of a court's invocation of
the doctrine to avoid a constitutional ruling. Thus, it is helpful to consider the
practical consequences that flow from the avoidance doctrine to determine
whether the doctrine promotes greater comity or greater discord between the
courts and Congress. Judge Posner explains that when courts construe statutes
to avoid constitutional questions, they are in fact broadening constitutional
prohibitions because, given the time pressures on Congress, legislators are
unlikely to overrule a judicial decision misconstruing one of their statutes." °
Similarly, Professor Schauer has noted that avoiding constitutional questions
actually leads courts down the road of deciding them because when courts
invoke the avoidance doctrine, they are signaling that the avoided statutory
construction raises constitutional doubts, thereby putting Congress on notice
of potentially problematic constructions." Once the Court alerts Congress to
constructions that the Court finds dubious, Schauer argues, it would be "silly"
for Congress to pass a statute that would likely face invalidation. 3 According
to Judge Posner, the practical effect of avoiding constitutional questions is to
create a "judge-made penumbra" around certain constitutional issues, thus
permitting the judiciary to expand the reach of constitutional prohibitions."M
IV Avoidance Doctrine's Role in the Development oflmmigration Policy
A. The Plenary Power Doctrine: Origins and Relative Decline
An inquiry into Congress's special authority over immigration matters
reveals that the judiciary's invocation of the avoidance doctrine in this legisla-
tive arena poses heightened separation of powers concerns. Congress is said
to enjoy "plenary power" over immigration matters due in part to Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the authority to "establish
101. See POSNER, supra note 50, at 285 (stating that it is unrealistic to think Congress has
time to reassess statute that courts have already found constituionally problematic).
102. See Schauer, supra note 80, at 88 (stating that when Court interprets statute to avoid
constitutional problems, it is in effect sending signal to Congress that if Congress amends
statute reaffirming Congress's original view and thus forces Court to decide constitutionality,
statute will likely face invalidation).
103. See id. (noting futility of congressional action in this situation).
104. See Richard A Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CEL L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (discussing "penumbra" effect); see also United
States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1318 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that avoidance doctrine is
"closer cousin to invalidation than to interpretation" because it allows courts to enforce
constitutional penumbras).
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an uniform Rule of Naturalization. 105 The plenary power doctrine entitling
Congress to special deference on immigration matters arises out of concerns for
national security, territorial sovereignty, and self preservation.'0 6 One argu-
ment supporting judicial restraint in the face of Congress's immigration author-
ity rests on the importance that the nation speak with one voice on matters of
immigration and foreign affairs.' ° A long line of Supreme Court decisions
affirms Congress's broad authority in the area of immigration law,"~ which is
defined as the admission and expulsion of aliens.' 9 Typically, courts fall back
on the plenary power argument to bar aliens' attempts to obtain judicial review
of congressional action affecting them.'
The special congressional authority in immigration law has led to its
isolation from the fundamental constitutional norms, administrative procedure,
and judicial self-assertion that define other areas of our legal system."'
However, this trend appears to have changed. Immigration law has begun to
105. See U.S. CONST. art. , § 8, cl. 4 (outlining congressional power over naturalization).
106. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:
Phantom ConstitutionalNorms andStatutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,551-52 (1990)
(stating that Congress historically had power to regulate immigration free from judicial review
based on these concerns) (citing Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)).
107. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 711 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating importance that
nation speak with one voice in fields of immigration and foreign affairs); see also STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND ThE JUDICIARY 217 (1987) (discussing Court's past insistence
on uniformity in nation's immigration laws) (citing Chao Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581 (1889)).
108. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (noting that Congress has plenary
power over admission of aliens); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (noting that
Congress has plenary power to make rules regulating admission and exclusion of aliens);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (stating that decisions
to expel or exclude aliens are largely immune from judicial control); Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (recalling that "over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" admission of aliens); see also
LEGOMSKY, supra note 107, at 213 (stating that Supreme Court historically rejected any judicial
review of constitutionality of immigration legislation). But see Keller v. United States, 213 U.S.
138, 148-49 (1909) (holding that Congress had no power to enact statute providing criminal
punishment for American citizen who harbored alien prostitute); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228, 243 (1896) (invalidating statute that imposed hard labor as punishment for
violation of immigration law without providing trial to establish guilt of accused).
109. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 565 (defining immigration law).
110. See LEGOMKY, supra note 107, at 218 (stating that until recently, aliens have been
unlikely to obtain constitutional review of congressional legislation due to Court's recognition
of plenary power doctrine).
111. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation ofImmigration Law, 84 COLuM. L. REV.
1, 1 (1984) (arguing that immigration law has been "radically insulated" from rest of our legal
system).
CONSTITUTIONAL A VOIDANCE IN ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS 993
recognize the rights of aliens. One scholar attributes this recognition to the
emphasis that "liberal values" have placed on the universal rights of man.112
The more likely explanation is that courts, over time, increasingly have
recognized that aliens have rights issuing from the Constitution, regardless of
whether their presence in the country is lawful.11 3 It is therefore little wonder
that recent courts - including the Supreme Court - have paid less heed to the
plenary power doctrine's call for complete noninterference by the judiciary
and instead have merely shown relative deference to Congress when imunigra-
tion matters are at issue.' 4 Specifically, courts have moved away from
absolute deference to Congress in their interpretation of immigration
statutes.1" The Court's recent pronouncement in Zadvydas that Congress's
plenary power is "subject to important constitutional limitations" bears out the
proposition that Congress's plenary power is no longer a universal norm.1 6
B. An Incrementalist Approach to Immigrant Rights:
Zadvydas, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, and Yick Wo's Progeny
In Zadvydas, the Court relied in part on the fact that it had imposed
constitutional limitations on plenary power in the past to reject the Govern-
ment's argument that the Attorney General had the statutory authority to hold
deportable aliens indefinitely in the interests of protecting the community.117
The Court found that, notwithstanding Congress's plenary power, the Attor-
ney General's reading of the provision that an alien "may be detained beyond
112. See id. at 4 (arguing that new "communitarian" values, which foster belief that govern-
ment should protect immigrants, should take root in tenet of liberalism that emphasizes individu-
als' essential and equal humanity).
113. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 584 (arguing that after Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886), courts applied constitutional scrutiny to cases involving aliens' rights,
including rights of aliens who were in country illegally or involuntarily).
114. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 107, at 219 (noting that plenary power doctrine is starting
to "warp," as Supreme Court and lower court decisions show relative deference toward Con-
gress regarding immigration matters as opposed to outright unwillingness to interfere). But see
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous
Border of the Plenary Power Doctine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1087,1157 (1995) (arguing
that "plenary power doctrine remains the central tenet of immigration law").
115. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 547-49 (noting that courts have weakened plenary
power doctrine through their interpretation of immigration statutes); see generally INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating provision of Immigration and Nationality Act as
unconstitutional).
116. Zadsydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
117. See id. at 689 (noting that in United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957), Court
limited Attorney General's discretion by permitting him only to question aliens about their
continued availability for deportation, and not to probe their political activities).
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the removal period" indefinitely would cause serious constitutional problems,
given the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause."8 Specifically, the Court
worried that indefinite detention of an alien might amount to a deprivation of
liberty without due process of law." 9 Fearful of the statute's potential to
violate the Due Process Clause, the Court felt that its duty was to avoid any
interpretation allowing for indefinite detention. 2'
The use of the avoidance doctrine in Zadvydas is consistent with Dean
Kloppenberg's thesis that the Court relies most heavily on this doctrine when
"socially sensitive cases" are at stake.' Kloppenberg's contention is particu-
larly salient in light of society's heightened interest in immigration matters
since September 11 12' But the complaints and frustrations leveled at the
avoidance doctrine by scholars such as Kloppenberg are inapplicable to
Zadvydas. One of Kloppenberg's chief criticisms of the avoidance doctrine
is that courts' reliance on it hampers the development of constitutional law."z
Kloppenberg further claims that courts use the avoidance doctrine to issue
"narrow or piecemeal rulings" that hamper the development of law in cases
dealing with race and gender discrimination.'24
With respect to Zadvydas, one can imagine that proponents of clear
constitutional development would like to know whether the Constitution
permits the Attorney General to hold indefinitely an alien whom the INS has
ordered deported - a question that bears on an alien's liberty interest and,
indirectly, on whether the government may abridge certain rights on account
of alienage. However, the mere fact that the Zadvydas Court applied the
avoidance doctrine, and thereby did not reach that question, does not mean
118. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... ").
119. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 ("Freedom from imprisonment - from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint - lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
Fifth Amendment Due Process] Clause protects.").
120. See id. at 689 (stating Court's view that statute must be read to limit alien's post-
removal detention period to time "reasonably necessary" to bring about alien's removal).
121. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (discussing avoidance doctrine as
shield for courts when controversial social issues are at stake).
122. See Opening at INS; Wanted: Miracle Worker for Conflicting Roles, SAN DIEGO
UNION - TRB., Aug. 20, 2002, at B6 (reporting that after September 11 terrorist attacks public
and Congress were outraged at "laissez-faire immigration policy" that was in place for decades).
123. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 19, at 276 (stating that when trial and appellate courts
decline to decide constitutional questions by relying on avoidance doctrine, they retard develop-
ment of constitutional law because they prevent constitutional issues from reaching Supreme
Court).
124. See id. at 15 (discussing how avoidance doctrine constricts development of certain
areas of law).
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE IN ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS 995
that the Court's holding will not contribute to the development of constitu-
tional law regarding alien rights. Professor Sunstein has noted that "narrow
and unambitious rulings have been central to the elaboration of constitutional
rights. The modem law of free speech was built not in a year or even in a
decade, but through a century of mostly incremental decisions."'2 In effect,
Sunstein seems to be telling proponents of an aggressive Court to "be patient."
Sunstein's point is particularly applicable in the area of immigration law.
Though it did not involve the avoidance doctrine, the well-known case Yick
Wo v. Hopkins126 supports the contention that a narrow ruling on constitutional
rights can be a springboard for elaboration of other constitutional rights.1 27
Yick Wo involved a facially-neutral ordinance requiring those operating
wooden laundries in the city of San Francisco to obtain permits." The board
issuing the permits denied permits to all two hundred Chinese applicants
while it granted permits to all non-Chinese applicants but one.129 The Court
found that despite their status as subjects of the Emperor of China, the laundry
operators nonetheless deserved the protections of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause.130 Accordingly, the Court held that the
discrimination against the aliens was illegal.'
The holding in Yick Wo that aliens were due the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment was arguably a narrow decision because the Court might
125. Sunstein, supra note 61, at 44.
126. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
127. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (finding that aliens lawfully in
United States receive protections of Constitution). In Yick Wo, the petitioners, natives of China
present in the United States but not United States citizens, sought relief before the Supreme
Court after being denied a writ of habeas corpus by the California Supreme Court. Id. at 356-
57. The city of San Francisco imprisoned the petitioners for violating a city ordinance that
forbade the operation of wooden laundries without a permit. Id. A city board of supervisors
issued the permits. Id. at 357. Natives of China owned approximately 240 of the 320 laundries
in the city. Id. at 358-59. Three hundred and ten of the laundries were constructed of wood and
thus within the purview of the ordinance. Id. at 359. The board of supervisors denied all
applications by approximately 200 Chinese people for permits to operate wooden laundries.
Id. Conversely, the board issued permits for all but one non-Chinese applicant Id. The Court
found that despite not being U.S. citizens, the plaintiffs were entitled to the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 368-69. In regard to the ordinance, the Court found that it was
facially impartial, but that it had been administered "with an evil eye and an unequal hand." Id.
at 373-74. Consequently, the Court concluded that the application of the ordinance amounted
to a denial of the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
374.
128. Id. at 357.
129. Id. at358-59.
130. See id. at 368-69 (finding aliens protected by Equal Protection Clause).
131. See id. at 374 (concluding that application of ordinance denied aliens equal protec-
tion).
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have gone much further by stating that aliens were entitled to the full panoply
of constitutional protections. But Yick Wo's narrow holding was nevertheless
significant because it signaled that aliens were to some extent under the consti-
tutional umbrella.'32 In subsequent years, the Court built on the basic precept
of Yick Wo to expand the constitutional rights of aliens. To wit, in Wong Wing
v. United States, 33 ten years after Yick Wo, the Court gave aliens the full range
of Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections. 34 In the 1931 case of Russian
Volunteer Fleet v. United States,'35 the Court relied on Yick Wo to apply the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause to aliens. 36
132. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 565 (noting that Yick Wo stands for principle that
aliens lawfully within United States are considered to be in "constitutional fold").
133. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
134. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that Due Process
Clause and indictment requirement entitled illegal Chinese aliens to judicial trial before they
could be sentenced to hard labor for violating Congress's exclusion laws). In Wong Wing, the
Court considered whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments applied to aliens sentenced to hard
labor. Id. at 233-34. A United States Customs Agent charged two Chinese citizens with being
unlawfully within the United States. Id. at 229. The Commissioner of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Michigan found that the Chinese citizens were unlaw-
fully within the United States and ordered them to be imprisoned at hard labor for sixty days,
after which they would be removed to China. Id. On a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the
Court considered the question of whether a congressional act excluding Chinese persons from
the United States violated the Constitution in that one of its provisions allowed for imprison-
ment at hard labor without a trial by jury. Id. at 235. The Court acknowledged Congress's
power to forbid aliens from coming within the country's borders and to expel aliens who are
unlawfully within its territory. Id. at 237. However, the Court found that any legislation
allowing for punishment of illegal aliens through hard labor must provide for a judicial trial in
order to be valid. Id. The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the indictment requirement of the Sixth Amendment forbade the government from holding
even aliens to answer for infamous crimes when no indictment had issued from a grand jury.
Id. at 238; see also Motomura, supra note 106, at 565-66 (noting that Wong Wing Court held
that aliens are entitled to "full range of protections" of Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
135. 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
136. See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (noting that
because petitioner corporation was alien friend, it was entitled to Fifth Amendment protection).
In Russian Volunteer Fleet, the Court considered whether an alien corporation, organized under
the laws of a regime not recognized by the United States, could maintain a takings claim. Id.
at 488. The United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation had requisitioned two
ship construction contracts from the petitioner, a Russian corporation. Id. at 486-87. The Court
of Claims dismissed the corporation's claim that it was due payment of just compensation for
the government's requisitioning. Id. at 487-88. The Court of Claims held that the corporation
could not maintain its suit because the United States had not recognized the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics. Id. at 488. However, the Supreme Court held that the corporation was an
alien friend and thus entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment Id. at 489. Because
the Fifth Amendment protects private property, the Court interpreted a congressional act
providing for compensation for government-seized vessels to include property of alien friends.
Id. at 491-92; see also Motomura, supra note 106, at 566 (noting that in Russian Volunteer
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This line of decisions following Yick Wo that protected the rights of aliens
did not spring from constitutional claims in admission and expulsion cases."3 7
Rather, they involved the fundamental rights of aliens and individuals gener-
ally. 38 One scholar has argued that because Yick Wo and its progeny dealt with
fundamental human rights rather than narrower admission and expulsion
decisions, these cases helped lead to an eventual attenuation of the plenary
power doctrine in imnigration law.'39 Furthermore, Yick Wo and its progeny
prove Professor Sunstein's underlying point that modest rulings in constitu-
tional law build on one another and together can have a powerful cumulative
effect.
140
V Avoidance Doctrine and the Other Branches
A. The September 11 Terrorist Attacks and Zadvydas 's Contribution to
the Debate on Immigration Policy
The following subpart analyzes the discussion of immigration policy in
Congress, American society, and the Department of Justice following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and will demonstrate how the Zadvydas
Court's decision to avoid a constitutional question resulted in a surprisingly
rich, more robust debate of immigration policy. One advantage of the avoid-
ance doctrine is that it allows judges, who are sensitive to the limitations of
their own constitutional authority, to refrain from issuing a broad ruling on the
nation"" or from trenching on the province of the political branches of govern-
Fleet, Court cited Yick We to extend protection of Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to
aliens).
137. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 566 (noting that Yick Wo court and its progeny took
constitutional claims seriously whereas courts hearing constitutional claims in immigration law
gave them "cavalier treatment").
138. See Russian Volunteer Fleet, 282 U.S. at 489 (holding that Takings Clause of Fifth
Amendment applied to alien corporation operating in United States and from whom U.S.
government requisitioned contracts for constructing ships); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 237
(holding that for statute requiring hard labor for Chinese nationals found within country to be
valid, it "must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused"); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (stating that "[t]he fourteenth amendment to the Constitu-
tion is not confined to the protection of citizens... [and its] provisions are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, of color, or of nationality"); see also Motomura, supra note 106, at 565-66 (noting
nonimmigration law nature of Yick Wo and other cases elaborating on aliens' rights).
139. See id. (arguing that Yick We, its offspring, and other cases dealing with individual
rights helped to undermine doctrine of plenary power by "afford[ing] a measure of protection
to aliens that much more closely resembles the substantive and procedural rights of individuals
in mainstream public law").
140. See supra text accompanying note 125 (describing Sunstein's argument regarding
cumulative effect of judicial incrementalism).
141. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 44-45 ("Even if an internal consensus emerges, and
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ment.42 In some cases, courts simply will not want to act, even when they have
the authority, if the ruling is likely to spark an adverse public reaction.'43
Although Zadvydas was decided several months before the September 11,2001
terrorist attacks, immigration policy was nevertheless critically important to
American society before the attacks, given the role of immigrants in the high-
tech, agriculture, and service sectors of the economy.1" It is not implausible
to think that even prior to September 11, the Court preferred that Congress
carry the burden of deciding important immigration issues, such as the govern-
ment's power to detain deportable aliens indefinitely.
The Court's decision in Zadvydas was unquestionably a significant
victory for immigrant rights in the United States. 4 ' While a declaration by the
Court that the detention statute was unconstitutional would have been even
more cause for celebration, the Court's decision to avoid the constitutional
question was an acknowledgment of immigrant rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause. 4 Although this was not the first time that the Court
acknowledged that immigrants enjoy constitutional protections,'47 it was eerily
even if the Court's majority is confident that it is right, it might hesitate to impose a broad rule
on the nation, for the simple reason that the nation might be reluctant to go along.").
142. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 563 (noting courts' unwillingness to "issue a
constitutional command" to other branches, due to courts' sensitivity about their own institu-
tional limitations).
143. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 45 (noting Supreme Court's unwillingness to strike
down constitutionally questionable law banning interracial marriage, in part because of adverse
public reaction that might follow considering that nation was in midst of controversial school
desegregation). The Court refused to strike down the statute in the 1956 case of Naim v. Naim,
350 U.S. 985 (1956). See Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 298,326 n.180 (1998) (stating that Court refused
to strike down Virginia anti-miscegenation statute in 1956, but did so later in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
144. See also Jonathan Peterson, Immigration Emphasis on Guest Visas Reform: A
Shortage of People for Low-Wage Jobs is ForcingAdministraion to Rethink lts Strategy, LA
TIMs, Aug. 18, 2001, at Al (reporting on United States' efforts to overhaul its immigration
policy to allow Mexican immigrants to participate in temporary service-sector work programs
similar to those already in place for high-tech and agricultural sectors).
145. See Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, As the World Turns: Immigration Law
Before and After SepL 11, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 2001, at 3 (stating that Zadvydas decision was
favorable to immigrants).
146. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (stating that "the Due Process Clause applies to all
'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, or permanent").
147. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,210 (1982) ("Aliens ... have long been recognized
as 'persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.");
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (indicating that "even one whose presence in this
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to" Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
due process protectionsy, see also supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing
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prophetic for the Court to invoke this principle just months prior to the
September 11 terrorist attacks and the vigorous debate over immigrant rights
that has followed. Indeed, the Zadvydas Court's statements on immigrants'
rights have not gone unnoticed in lower courts in cases heard since September
11 . 4 Nor was the Court's mention of terrorists as a possible exception to its
holding lost on those who favor stricter immigration policy.149 In short, the
Court's decision to avoid the constitutional question in Zadvydas informed,
but did not decide, the subsequent inuigrant-rights debate - a proposition
supported by the fact that both immigration proponents and national security
hawks rely on the Zadvydas opinion to support their respective positions. °
This type of cautious approach to socially-sensitive issues is exactly the role
that the Court plays so masterfilly, according to Sunstein,
151 and so frustrat-
ingly, according to Kloppenberg.1
52
Furthermore, the Zadydas Court's decision to abstain from determining
whether indefinite detention of aliens violated due process vindicated one of
the avoidance doctrine's underlying purposes by allowing the Court to decide
only the case at hand and not to decide the law for the future.5 3 Given that
judiciary's expansion of constitutional protections available to aliens).
148. See Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002) (relying in part on
Zadvydas to conclude that mandatory detention under Immigration and Nationality Act statute
violated substantive due process rights of petitioners); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523, 527-28
(9th Cir. 2002) (relying on Zadvydas in part to hold that law requiring aliens who had served
criminal sentences and were awaiting deportation hearings to be held without bail was unconsti-
tutional as applied to lawful permanent resident aliens). Counsel for the immigrant challenging
the law in Kim stated that "[t]his decision reminds us that it is unconstitutional and counterpro-
ductive to lock people up without a hearing .... It is so significant that in this post-9/11
climate a court is still ready to say that there are checks and balances, that the Constitution
applies." Henry Weinstein, Appeals Panel Strikes Down No-Bail Law, LA. TIMES, Jan. 10,
2002, at BI.
149. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing Zadvydas Court's mention
of terrorists as possible exception); see also Griffin Bell, Ashcrofl Is Right to Detain Suspects
in Terror Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2001, at A18 (suggesting that terrorist exception in
Zadvydas vindicated Justice Department's decision to jail suspected terrorists after September
11 attacks).
150. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (discussing reliance on snippets of
Zadvydas decision to support various and divergent opinions).
151. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 45 (stating that judges often avoid deciding constitu-
tional issues because of "salutary humility" that prevents them from deciding issues on which
they are ill-prepared to decide).
152. See KLoPPENBERG, supra note 19, at I ("When judges avoid judicial review of the
most politically and socially controversial issues, they evade their constitutional responsibil-
ity.").
153. See SUNSTEUN, supra note 99, at 42 (explaining that one strategy for using avoidance
doctrine is that it allows court to decide case at bar on its facts alone without binding courts in
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immigration policy soon became the central focus for lawmakers and for much
of the American public after September 11, the narrow decision in Zadvydas
likely helped to create an atmosphere for a freer and fuller discussion of
immigrant rights because the Court had kept open important questions relating
to the extent of such rights.'5
Sunstein has noted two major advantages of judicial minimalism, both of
which arguably are on display in Zadvydas. One advantage, writes Sunstein,
is that "certain forms of minimalism are democracy promoting, not only in the
sense that they leave issues open for democratic deliberation, but also and more
fundamentally in the sense that they promote reason-giving and ensure that
certain important decisions are made by democratically accountable actors.""
Justice Breyer may have referenced these same concerns in Zadvydas when he
noted that "if Congress had meant to authorize long-term detention of unre-
movable aliens, it certainly could have spoken in clearer terms."ol"
7
Sunstein suggests that a second justification for taking the minimalist path
exists "when the Court is dealing with a constitutional issue of high complexity
about which many people feel deeply and on which the nation is divided."' 58
In Zadvydas, the complex constitutional issue at stake was the liberty interest
of aliens, the scope of which the Court clearly struggled with throughout the
opinion, stating that "the Due Process Clause protects an alien subject to a final
order of deportation, though the nature of that protection may vary.' ' 59 The
Court continued, "[w]e believe that an alien's liberty interest is, at the least,
strong enough to raise a serious question as to whether ... the Constitution
permits detention that is indefinite. "'6 The Court's refusal to provide a defini-
tive rule about the scope of an alien's interest proved to be a harbinger of
American society's own uncertainty about immigrants and the extent of their
rights, as the debate following the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 aptly
displayed.161
future similar cases).
154. See Michael Collins, Aftermath ofAttacksPutsSocialLegislation on Hold; Focus on
Terrorism Delays Work on a Wide Range ofBills, SEATIE POST-INTELUGENCER, Dec. 8,2001,
at A2 (discussing Congress's sole focus on antiterrorism legislation in period after September
11 attacks).
155. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 19 (noting that typical minimalist decisions leave
Ocertain key questions open").
156. Id. at5.
157. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697.
158. SUNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 5.
159. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94.
160. Id. at 696.
161. See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, US. and Mexico to Resume Talks on Immigration
Policy; Issue Will Be Recast as One of National Security, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A40
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It is often said of narrow, minimalist decisions that they are as important
for what they do not say as for what they do say. 62 While minimalist-minded
courts often issue narrow holdings for the sake of shifting the decisionmaking
to other government actors, it is possible that a court, in issuing a painstakingly
narrow ruling, can cause the opposite effect by deciding issues that it claims
not to be deciding. For instance, in Zadvydas the Court made clear the scope
of its ruling by crystallizing a single issue: "mhe issue we address is whether
aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be condemned
to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States."'63 Just as
clearly as the Court stated the issue it decided, the Court stated an issue it did
not decide: "The question before us is not one of conferring on those admitted
the right to remain against the national will or sufferance of aliens who should
be removed."'" The Court was also clear that it was not "consider[ing] terror-
ism or other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for
forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments
of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.'
6
3
Against the backdrop of the Court's painstakingly precise holding, I will next
consider how Congress and the executive branch interpreted the Court's
careful choice of language.'"
B. Zadvydas as Authority for Legislative and Regulatory Response
to Terrorism
1. Department ofJustice Profiling
Although seemingly unimportant at the time the Court issued its opinion,
the Zadvydas Court's disclaimers about what it did not decide would later be
used to validate the Justice Department's controversial profiling of certain
ethnicities, 17 INS regulations written in response to the Zadiydas opinion,'
(noting shift in public mood about admitting foreigners into United States).
162. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 3 (pointing out that courts often will go to great
lengths to leave certain things unsaid in their opinions).
163. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
164. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at 696.
166. See infra Part V.B (discussing reaction of executive and legislative branches to
Zadvydas opinion).
167. See Email from Bryan Sierra, Public Affairs Specialist, United States Department of
Justice, to Linda Newell, Reader Services Assistant, Washington and Lee University Law
Library [hereinafter DOJ Email] (Feb. 28, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (noting Department of Justice's position that "[w]e will continue to focus investigative,
intelligence-gathering and enforcement operations on individuals in the U.S. from countries
with highly active al Qaeda networks to protect Americans"); Robert A. Levy, The Nationality
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and also antiterrorism legislation that Congress passed into law following the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.169 Particularly important was the
Court's statement that although indefinite detention of undeportable aliens
raised serious constitutional doubts, the Court did not entertain the same
doubts about the government's ability to hold suspected terrorists indefi-
nitely.
70
In January 2002, the Justice Department identified 6,000 immigrants of
Middle Eastern descent who had ignored deportation orders and deemed their
arrest and removal a high priority. 7 ' The Department specifically targeted the
Middle Eastern men out of 300,000 similarly situated immigrants because the
men were from countries considered havens for Osama bin Laden's terrorist
network.' The Justice Department's rule spelled racial profiling to some," 3
but others contended that the government has a right to treat people unequally
if it has a compelling reason - here, the prevention of future terrorist acts. 74
More importantly, racial profiling typically entails the use of race "to investi-
gate, apprehend and detain" suspected wrongdoers, whereas in this case the
Justice Department sought to deport known lawbreakers.' Although the
Tes4 NAT'L REV. ON-LINE (Jan. 14, 2002), at httpY/www.nationalreview.com/comment/
comment-levyO I1402.shtrml (last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (arguing that Department of Justice's
targeting of certain ethnic groups for deportation is constitutional because targets are known
lawbreakers).
168. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg.
56,967, 56,973 (Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 and pt. 241) (giving Attorney
General express authority for "continued detention" of those aliens whose release "would result
in serious damage to the national security or pose an imminent threat of terrorism").
169. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (enacting new
antiterrorism measures).
170. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing Zadvydas Court's mention
of terrorists as possible exception).
171. See Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks ThousandsofFugiiveDeportees;
Middle Eastern Men Are Focus of Search, WAMH POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at Al (reporting that
effort to round up Middle Eastern men is part of larger plan to find 300,000 "absconders" who
have remained in country despite orders requiring their deportation).
172. See DOJ Email, supra note 167 (discussing Department of Justice's efforts to locate
illegal aliens from countries with active al Qaeda cells); see also Eggen & Thompson, supra
note 171, at Al (noting that Justice Department is targeting men from countries with active al
Qaeda cells).
173. See id. (reporting complaints by Arab-American and immigration advocacy groups
that Bush administration, in its zeal to stamp out terrorism,, is engaging in racial profiling).
174. See Levy, supra note 167 (arguing that equal protection guarantees allow government
to treat people unequally if compelling interest is present and means chosen to satisfy interest
are least intrusive possible).
175. See id. (noting that profiling is not objectionable in this case because profilers seek
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Court probably did not intend it, one commentator pointed to a subtle qualifi-
cation in the Zadvydas holding to support the government's "manhunt" of
Middle Eastern men."" In short, the argument goes that although Zadvydas
reaffirmed that immigrants, whether legal or illegal, receive the protections of
due process, the Court explicitly stated that this right did not run so far as to
guarantee an immigrant an inviolable right to remain in the country.1"
2. 1NS Rule
The INS interim rule that implemented the Zadvydas opinion provides
procedures for determining whether the INS can continue to detain an alien
whose removal in the reasonably foreseeable future is unlikely because he
poses a foreign policy, national security, or terrorism concern."7 In essence,
these regulations give the Secretary of State the authority to determine
whether the release of an alien would have adverse foreign policy or national
security consequences. They also allow the Attorney General to decide




The Justice Department and the INS were not alone in noting the terrorist
exception that the Court carved out in Zadvydas. 0 Prior to the release of the
INS regulations and just six weeks after the World Trade Center attacks,
Congress passed legislation giving the government new powers to combat
men because of their conduct, not their nationality).
176. See id. (justifying INS's "manhunt" of 6,000 Middle Eastern men who have ignored
deportation orders by relying on Zadvydas Court's statement that admitted immigrants may lose
right to remain in country).
177. See id. (noting that "there is no constitutional or statutory right for a lawbreaker to
escape punishment"); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 ("The question before us is not one of
conferring on those admitted the right to remain against the national will or sufferance of aliens
who should be removed.").
178. See Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, supra note
168, at 56,973-74 (leaving within Secretary of State's discretion determination of whether alien
poses threat of "adverse foreign policy consequences" such that alien should continue to be
detained; also leaving within Attorney General's discretion determination of whether alien poses
national security or terrorism threat warranting continued detention after six months of detention
following removal order).
179. See id. (outlining authority of Secretary of State and Attorney General over aliens
deemed to pose national security threat).
180. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (discussing congressional attempt to
authorize Attorney General to take severe measures to prevent would-be alien terrorists).
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terrorism."" The debate in the Senate on the USA PATRIOT Act' 2 included
a reference to the Zadvydas Court's bow to the government's discretion in
managing terrorist threats. " Among the new powers that Congress bestowed
on the government through the USA PATRIOT Act is the power of the
Attorney General to detain aliens that the INS ordered deported but for whom
deportation is impossible, provided that the Attorney General "certifies" that
the alien is "engaged in any.. . activity that endangers the national security
of the United States..'. 4 Detention may continue, subject to review every six
months by the Attorney General, and could become indefinite. "
181. USA PATRIOT Act of2001,Pub. L. No. 107-56,115 Stat. 272 (authorizing new law
enforcement measures to combat terrorism).
182. Id.
183. See 147 CoNo. REc. S11,047 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (joint memorandum of Sen.
Kennedy and Sen. Brownback on the immigration provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001) (discussing Zadvydas Court's terrorism comment). Senators Kennedy and Brownback
submitted into the record a joint memorandum that cited Zadvydas:
For aliens whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, the
Attorney General is required to demonstrate that release of the alien will adversely
affect national security or the safety of the community or any person before deten-
tion may continue beyond the removal period. Indefinite detention of aliens is
permitted only in extraordinary circumstances. Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491
(2001).
147 CONo. REc. S 1,047 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
184. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412,115 Stat. 272,351; see also
147 CONo. REc. S11,056 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (analysis of legislation prepared by Depart-
ment of Justice that Sen. Hatch asked to be read into record) ("The legislation expands the
grounds for deeming an alien inadmissible or deportable from the United States for terrorist
activity, provides for the mandatory detention of aliens whom the Attorney General certifies
pose a risk to the national security. .. ").
185. See 147 CoNo. REc. SI 1,022 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold)
(describing USA PATRIOT Act's alien detention provisions). Senator Feingold stated:
[T]he bill would nevertheless continue to permit the indefinite detention in two
situations. First, immigrants who win their deportation cases may be continued to
be held if the Attorney General continues to have suspicions. Second, this provi-
sion creates a deep unfairness to immigrants who are found not to be deportable for
terrorism but have an immigration status violation, such as overstaying a visa.
Id.; see also USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351
(adding to Immigration and Nationality Act new § 236A (aX6)-(7) requiring review of
deportable alien's detention every six months in order for detention based on alien's threat to
national security to continue); 147 CoNo. REc. S1 1,056 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (analysis of
legislation prepared by Department of Justice that Sen. Hatch asked to be read into record) ("In
the rare cases where removal is determined appropriate but is not possible, detention may
continue upon a review by the Attorney General every 6 months."); Jeffrey Rosen, Holding
Pattern: Why Congress Must Stop Ashcroft sAlien Detentions, NEw REPuBuc, Dec. 10,2001,
at 16 (stating that some aliens have been detained for months and risk indefinite detention due
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The flurry of legislative and regulatory activity seeking to cement the
federal government's power over suspected terrorists as permitted in Zadvydas
has been deemed by one commentator as "exploit[ing] [a] loophole for all it's
worth.'1#8 6 Clearly, the exploitation is in part a reflection of a rattled govern-
ment seeking maximum power to respond to a national security threat. How-
ever, upon reconsideration of Justice Breyer's "loophole," one wonders if he
intended it to be just that."7 Does Justice Breyer's loophole mean that terror-
ists should not receive the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?s
Was he implying that courts should give the political branches "leeway" when
determining whether the government may constitutionally hold aliens sus-
pected of terrorism for an indefinite period oftime?8 9 Did he intend to give the
government a free hand in determining who is a suspected terrorist and how
long it may detain such suspects in the absence of deportation? Or should we
interpret the loophole as dictum posing a constitutional question that the Court
has yet to address? 90 Whatever Justice Breyer intended, it is clear that Con-
gress and the Justice Department have interpreted his comments about sus-
pected terrorists rather broadly and, as a consequence, have written regulations
that might stand on shaky constitutional ground.19'
to new antiterrorism legislation passed by Congress).
186. Rosen, supra note 185, at 16.
187. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing Zadyvdas majority's
terrorism exception).
188. Robert A. Levy, Not on Our Soil, NAT'L REV. ON-LINE (Jan. 25, 2002), at
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-levy012502.shtm (last visited Apr. 19,
2002) (queying whether alleged international terrorists who face trial by military tribunal enjoy
constitutional protection of due process and speedy, public trial). The Fifth Amendment
provides, in pertinent part: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "[I]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial .. " U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
189. See Rosen, supra note 185, at 16 (stating that Breyer's opinion stressed that govern-
ment might have more leeway to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely).
190. See Jonathan Ringel, Will New Anti-Terror Tools Pass Court Muster?, LEGAL TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2001, at 14 (noting Congress's attempts at crafting antiterrorism legislation in light of
Zadvydas opinion and Justice Breyer's terrorist comment).
191. Compare Rosen, supra note 185, at 16 (stating that although congressional
antiterrorism legislation and INS regulations give government "tremendous discretion," it is
unlikely that Court will raise constitutional objections) with Stuart Taylor, Jr., Ashcroft's 'Trust
Us' Routine is Getting a Little Stale, NAT'L J., Nov. 17, 2001, at 3569 (lampooning Attorney
General John Ashcroft as "bull in the constitutional china shop" on account of Department of
Justice's numerous immigrant detentions and new rules allowing government to eavesdrop on
discussions between suspected terrorists and their lawyers).
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If the newly promulgated INS and congressional provisions indeed
provoke a constitutional controversy, then the Court's use of the avoidance
doctrine in Zadvydas will have yielded an odd result in that by seeking to avoid
one constitutional question, the Court will have indirectly precipitated others.
Granted, Congress did not force the Court's hand by passing follow-up legisla-
tion after Zadvdas to give the Attorney General express authority to detain
undeportable aliens indefinitely, as Judge Posner and Professor Schauer have
observed Congress is not likely to do.1" However, Congress did take full
advantage of the Zadiydas dictum on terrorism by giving the Attorney General
the power to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely. 93 Many have called the
constitutionality of this provision into question, and if the issue is litigated,
such a suit will be an unintended by-product of an opinion that sought in the
first place to avoid an unnecessary constitutional ruling.194
Professor Sunstein has noted the paradoxical tendency of minimalist
decisions to send loud messages, despite judges' self-conscious efforts to rule
narrowly.' 95 This phenomenon is clearly at work in Zadvydas, as the INS and
Congress seized the majority's exclusion of suspected terrorists from its
holding to write into law explicit provisions that allow the government to hold
suspected alien terrorists indefinitely if they are not deportable.1" These laws
allow the federal government to treat a deportable alien whom it deems to be
a suspected terrorist radically differently from a deportable alien who prompts
no government suspicions of terrorist ties. Although the Attorney General
must review both aliens' cases every six months to determine whether circum-
stances have changed to make deportation possible," it is reasonable to
assume that suspected terrorists will be much less likely to obtain release from
detention or to be removed from the country, lest they subsequently plot
terrorist acts against the United States. This is yet another acknowledged
192. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's unwillingness
to force Court to decide constitutionality of issue once Court has indicated possible constitu-
tional doubt).
193. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (noting that Zadvydas's terrorist
exception was incorporated into congressional statute).
194. Cf. KLOPPENBEGo, supra note 19, at 271 (opining that Rehnquist Court has developed
avoidance of constitutional questions into "art form").
195. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 22 (noting that judicial opinions often are meant to
be "small steps, but they are taken as large signals" by public officials).
196. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text (describing Attorney General's
significant new authority to detain aliens suspected of terrorism).
197. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351
(adding to Immigration and Nationality Act new § 236A (aX6)-(7) requiring review of
deportable alien's detention every six months in order for detention based on alien's threat to
national security to continue).
1006
CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE IN ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
difficulty of narrow rulings, according to Sunstein, for it sometimes allows
different treatment of similarly situated people."r Despite the inequitable
results that minimalist decisions sometimes can produce in the case of individ-
uals, such decisions can nevertheless foster communication between different
branches of government. The next section considers how the Zadvydas deci-
sion prompted such communication.
C. Avoidance Doctrine and the Separation of Powers
1. Congress's Implicit Acceptance ofZadvydas 's Statutory Construction
The legislative and regulatory changes in immigration policy after Sep-
tember 11 provide an important opportunity to evaluate the validity of Justice
Kennedy's criticism that the Zadyvdas majority opinion "misunderstands" the
avoidance doctrine.199 Justice Kennedy charged that the Court's avoidance
resulted in the Court writing its own statute in disregard of congressional
intent,2  caused an intrusion on the other branches of government,2"' and
culminated in a "systematic dislocation in the balance of powers." 2 Reading
Justice Kennedy's stark conclusions, one has the impression that Justice
Kennedy believed the Court's use of avoidance had set the legislative and
judicial branches on a separation of powers collision course. However, the
September 11 terrorist attacks forced the issue of immigration into the spotlight
so that Congress, riding on a very strong public mandate to stamp out
terrorism,' was in a position to rebuke the Supreme Court for its statutory
interpretation in Zadvydas. Indeed, Congress might have forced the Court to
confront whether indefinite detention of deportable aliens was repugnant to the
Fifth Amendment. That Congress chose not to disabuse the Court of its
statutory interpretation would seemingly validate the Court's reliance on the
avoidance doctrine and downplay Justice Kennedy's separation of powers
concerns.
198. See SuNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 11 (stating "narrowness may run into difficulty if it
means that similarly situated people are being treated differently").
199. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court, it is submitted,
misunderstands the principle of constitutional avoidance which it seeks to invoke.").
200. See id. at 705 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (arguing that majority had written "a statutory
amendment of its own" in "obvious disregard of congressional intent").
201. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("In the guise of judicial restraint the Court ought
not to intrude upon the other branches.").
202. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
203. See Jeffrey Rosen, Stephen Breyer Restrains Himset. Modest Proposal, NEW
REPUBUC, Jan. 14, 2002, at 25 (noting that September 11 attacks reminded public of govern-
ment's need for broad powers to fight complicated terrorist threats).
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As noted in Part IH.C, Judge Posner has questioned Congress's practical
ability to overrule a court's misconstruction of one of its statutes, given the
time pressures on Congress." After September 11, however, Congress fo-
cused almost exclusively on adopting measures to reduce the terrorist threat20"
and therefore had ample time to consider the related question of whether it
would force the Supreme Court to face the constitutionality of indefinite
government detention of deportable aliens. Although the circumstances were
ripe, Congress declined to communicate any dissatisfaction with the Court's
statutory interpretation in Zadvydas and, in so doing, implicitly dispelled
Justice Kennedy's claim that the Court had "press[ed] statutory construction
to the point of disingenuous evasion."206
Another of Judge Posner's observations about the avoidance doctrine is
that it increases constitutional prohibitions, which he objects to because the
prohibitions emanate from judges, rather than from the Constitution." 7 Judge
Posner contends that such "judge-made penumbra[s]" increase friction between
the judicial and legislative branches.2"6 Although Judge Posner's opinion
about the avoidance doctrine's tendency to cause interbranch friction likely
refers to how the doctrine works in ordinary circumstances, Congress and the
Justice Department have arguably embraced the Zadvydas opinion in their
efforts to respond to the terrorist threats following September 11 29
Indeed, far from stirring up conflict between Congress and the Supreme
Court, the Zadiydas opinion seems to have set the stage for a dialogue between
the two branches about immigration rights in the context of Congress's at-
tempts to adopt antiterrorism legislation. Testimony submitted at congressio-
204. See POSNER, supra note 50, at 285 (discussing unlikelihood that Congress would
redraft statute after Court's finding of constitutional doubt).
205. See Collins, supra note 154, at A2 (noting that social issues have received little
attention from Congress who is "consumed" with responding to terrorist threat).
206. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52,62 (1997)).
207. See POSNER, supra note 50, at 285 (discussing objections to avoidance doctrine).
208. See id. (arguing that constitutional avoidance doctrine exacerbates interbranch
tension). Judge Posner writes:
The practical effect of interpreting statutes to avoid raising constitutional questions
is therefore to enlarge the already vast reach of constitutional prohibition beyond
even the most extravagant modem interpretations of the Constitution - to create a
judge-made "penumbra" that has much the same prohibitory effect as the judge-
made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself - and in doing so to sharpen
the tensions between the legislative and judicial branches.
Id.
209. See supra Part V.B (discussing citation of Zadvydas opinion in news articles, Senate
floor debates, and INS regulations to justify new antiterrorism and immigration policies).
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nal committee hearings on the government's detention policies routinely cited
the Zadvydas Court's view that the due process rights afforded to immigrants -
that ultimately caused the Court to invoke the avoidance canon to arrive at a
statutory construction that was not violative of immigrants' due process
rights - were the same as those afforded to regular citizens.10 Some members
of Congress appear to have noticed the Zadvydas Court's statements on immi-
grant rights. For instance, Senator John Edwards stated during a Senate floor
debate that any legislation Congress adopted to fight terrorism should include
due process protections for aliens detained because of national security
threats.21 ' That the legislation Congress ultimately passed was sensitive to
aliens' due process rights 12 demonstrates that the Court's invocation of the
avoidance doctrine to send an important message to Congress does not neces-
sarily contribute to friction between the two branches. In fact, when Congress
accepted the Court's statutory construction, greater comity arguably resulted
because Congress vindicated the Court's decision not to make an unnecessary
constitutional ruling.213 In effect, the Zadvydas decision served the separation
of powers principle because the Court, by avoiding a constitutional showdown,
210. See Immigration Detention Policy: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Immi-
gration and Claims of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of
Margaret H. Taylor, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law) (informing
Committee of Zadvydas Court's recent reminder that Due Process Clause extends to all persons,
including aliens, within United States); Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our
Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing on Review of Military Terrorism
Tribunals Before Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement for Record of
American Civil Liberties Union) (same).
211. See 147 CoNG. REc. S10,589 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Edwards)
(noting that antiterrorism legislation must provide due process protections for aliens). Senator
Edwards stated:
As Chairman Leahy and Senator Hatch have both said, this legislation is not
perfect, and the House-Senate Conference may yet make improvements. For
example, the Conference might clarify that, as to aliens detained as national security
threats, the law will secure the due process protections and judicial review required
by the Constitution and by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Zadvydas v.
Davis and INS v. St. Cyr.
147 CONG. REc. S10,589 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2001) (statement of Sen. Edwards).
212. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 412, 115 Stat. 272, 351
(adding to Immigration and Nationality Act new § 236A (aX6)-(7) requiring review of
deportable alien's detention every six months in order for detention based on alien's threat to
national security to continue); see also supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (describing
indefinite detention of aliens as permitted only in extraordinary circumstances and subject to
review every six months by Attorney Oeneral).
213. See Krent, supra note 86, at 209, 212-13 (noting that if Congress accepts Court's use
of avoidance doctrine, Court's use of this interpretative tool will prevent unnecessary constitu-
tional ruling).
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was able to prod Congress into considering aliens' constitutional rights rather
than invalidating the statute outright; this tactic left Congress's supremacy in
legislative matters intact."14
2. A Judicial Check on the Plenary Power Doctrine
In addition to providing grounds on which to validate Congress's statute,
the Court's use of the avoidance canon in Zadvydas further advanced the
separation of powers concept by allowing the Court to question, albeit in a
low-pitched manner, the plenary power doctrine. Professor Brian Murchison
has noted that judges sometimes rely on the avoidance canon 'to dispense
with authoritative pronouncements and to reflect upon, and challenge, current
norms. 21 5  Interestingly, much of Justice Kennedy's dissent consists of
authoritative pronouncements about Congress's and the executive's special
authority over foreign policy and immigration.216 Moreover, Justice Kennedy
suggested that the Court's application of the avoidance doctrine took judicial
independence too far because it fundamentally undermined the long-venerated
notion of Congress's plenary power in immigration matters and Congress's
ability to delegate that power to the executive branch's discretion.
2 17
As Professor Murchison points out, the avoidance canon allows judges to
assert their independence when deciding cases "without sailing the whirling
waters of the separation of powers doctrine. '" 218 This seems to be precisely
what the Zadvydas majority did when it stated that its review of the govern-
ment's implementation of the detention statute "must take appropriate account
of the greater immigration-related expertise of the executive branch."21 9 But
immediately after offering this curtsy to the executive, the majority implied
214. See Kelley, supra note 52, at 843 ("In the wake of the Ashwander concurrence and
the New Deal repudiation of the Lochner era it thus became an accepted part of our separation
of powers culture that legislative supremacy dictated that the Court decide constitutional
questions only when there was no other alternative.").
215. Murchison, supra note 55, at 168.
216. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 705-12 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that majority
"commit[s] its own grave constitutional error by arrogating to the judicial branch the Power to
summon high officers of the executive to assess their progress in conducting some of the
Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign powers," that there is "an obvious necessity
that the Nation speak with one voice on immigration and foreign affairs matters," and that
through its decision the Court is "ventur[ing] into foreign affairs management").
217. See id. at 711 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority is substituting its
judgment for executive branch discretion to detain removable aliens, which Congress delegated
to executive in exercising its plenary power over immigration matters).
218. Murchison, supra note 55, at 113.
219. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700.
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that its deference ran only so far and that it had a responsibility to look beyond
the plenary power doctrine: "[W]e believe that courts can take appropriate
account of such matters without abdicating their legal responsibility to review
the lawfulness of an alien's continued detention."2 0 The Court therefore
imposed on the executive a process whereby after six months, a detained alien
may show that the government cannot remove him in the reasonably foresee-
able future and that he is thus entitled to release. 221
The Zadvydas majority's use of the avoidance doctrine to exercise
judicial independence in a controversy in which the political branches claim
plenary power is consistent with a judicial trend to cut away at that doctrine
through statutory interpretation. 222 As discussed in Part IV.A, courts have
relied on phantom, rather than constitutional, norms to create constitutional
doubts in immigration statutes.2' Courts, in turn, avoid these "phantom"
constitutional doubts, and in some cases they have become a way for "consci-
entious judges [to respond] to the perceived anachronistic character of plenary
power. 024
Consistent with the view that judges play a significant role in challenging
the plenary power doctrine, Professor Peter Schuck has noted an "emergent
judicial assertiveness that is both a hallmark and a necessary condition of
immigration law's incipient transformation." According to Schuck, judges
can alleviate some of the conflict caused by the transformation of immigration
law away from the plenary power doctrine by demanding "clear statement"
requirements rather than resorting to constitutional rulings.' If the courts can
walk this fine line, they will preserve the separation of powers structure, for
they will "maintain their traditional concern for the protection of individual
220. Id.
221. See id. at 701 (establishing procedure by which aliens can challenge indefinite
detention).
222. See Motomura, supra note 106, at 549 (stating that courts have undermined plenary
power doctrine through statutory interpretation).
223. See id. at 564 (explaining "phantom constitutional norms"). Professor Motomura
states:
"[P]hantom constitutional norms" are "constitutional" in the sense that they, having
been at least seriously entertained as a constitutional argument and in many cases
actually adopted as an expressly constitutional decision in other areas of law, then
carry over to immigration cases, where they are substantial enough to serve the
limited function of informing interpretation of immigration statutes.
Id.
224. Id. at 613.
225. Schuck, supra note I11, at 82.
226. See id. at 84 (suggesting that "courts should seek relatively flexible solutions, such
as 'clear statement' requirements... rather than finding refuge in rigid constitutional rulings").
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rights and procedural fairness"' while acting independently to help bring
immigration law "within the mainstream of our public law."'
VI. Conclusion
Despite criticism that the avoidance doctrine lends itself to judicial
manipulation of legislative statutes - and therefore undermines Congress's
primacy in lawmaking - the doctrine in fact supports Congress's legislative
role in the constitutional scheme." 9 When a court relies on the avoidance
doctrine to refrain from making a constitutional ruling, it responds to Con-
gress's preference for validation over invalidation, promotes democracy by
leaving open issues for deliberation, and ensures that important public policy
decisions are made by lawmakers who are accountable to the public.23 The
avoidance doctrine provides judges an important device that allows them to
pay proper respect to Congress's powers and discretion, thus preserving the
separation of powers principle of the Constitution.23
These justifications for the avoidance doctrine were on full display in
Zadvydas v. Davis. By avoiding a constitutional ruling on whether indefinite
detention of deportable aliens violated the Due Process Clause, the Court
signaled to Congress its concern about the constitutionality of indefinite alien
detention. Congress heard the Court loud and clear, as proven by the rich
debate on immigrant rights that occurred during Congress's consideration of
antiterrorism legislation.232 Moreover, the Court's decision to decline from
making a constitutional ruling in Zadyvdas reflected the American public's
own uncertainty about the extent of immigrant rights and left the ultimate
decision to Congress, where the matter could receive adequate deliberation.
233
This result, Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Brandeis might argue, is
desirable for it both respects Congress's legislative supremacy and confirms
the Court's own task of judicial review.
227. Id. at 85.
228. Id. at 90.
229. See supra Part VA (discussing democracy-promoting aspects of constitutional avoid-
ance doctrine).
230. See supra Parts liA and VA (discussing practical values of avoidance doctrine).
231. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing judiciary's use of avoidance doctrine to inject
judicial independence into controversy in which executive and legislative branches are in-
volved).
232. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing importance of Zadvydas opinion in context of
Congress's consideration of USA PATRIOT Act).
233. See supra Part V.C. I (discussing Congress's ultimate acceptance of Zadvydas's
statutory construction).
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